Introduction
Dawn in Perth on the morning of June 28 2005 came at 7.18am. The overnight temperature had dropped to a low of 3.5 degrees and as the sun came up, a cold wind blew from the north. Susan Symons, company secretary of listed wine producer Evans & Tate Ltd was already on her way to the office. It was to be an eventful day. That morning, at 7.52am, she sent a fax transmission to the Australian Stock Exchange requesting that a trading halt be imposed over the company's securities, pending a material announcement to the market.
In the days leading up to the announcement, the company's share price had suffered a severe battering. While each ordinary share had been priced at a little over a dollar during the first two months of the year 1 , a creeping decline in sentiment saw the market value of each ordinary equity security fall to around 70 cents, where it hovered from late April until the 22 nd of June. On that day, the company's share price closed sharply down at 60 cents, after rumours began circulating that administrators had been called into the company 2 . Despite strenuous denials from the company, the rout continued. By June 27, the closing share price was just 31 cents 3 .
On June 29, the much awaited Evans & Tate shareholder update was broadcast to the market. It contained a bombshell. Despite a raft of previous statements to the contrary 4 , the company now believed that it would report a loss for the year ended 30
June 2005. However, the company also announced its intention to declare a final dividend on both the company's ordinary and preference shares, somewhat lessening the sting of the news that a loss would be incurred for the year's trading. Indeed, the market reaction to the company's June 29 shareholder announcement was clear, swift and positive. The price of the company's ordinary shares leapt to 40 cents by the close of trade that day, and then to 51 cents the next day 5 .
Only one and a half months later, on the morning of August 16, the company released a further shareholder update to the market. This time the news was far worse than it had been at the end of June. The projected loss had ballooned to the extent that there would not be sufficient retained earnings to pay dividends on either the company's preference or ordinary shares. By the end of that day, almost 20% had been wiped off the value of the ordinary shares 6 .
These events did not transpire in an institutional void, but rather, against a background of considerable regulation and legal duty -in particular, the requirements of the ASX continuous disclosure regime 7 , the statutory duties requiring care, diligence and good faith by company directors embedded in the Corporations Act 8 and the prohibition on misleading and deceptive conduct contained in the Trade Practices Act 9 . Further, they occurred under circumstances in which there can be no doubt that the company, through its directors and officers, knew that the information it released on June 29 and August 16 10 was likely to have a material impact on the market price of its securities and was likely to be relied upon by market participants in informing the pricing and investing process. Section 2 provides a background on Evans & Tate and the evolution of its business over time. Section 3 contains an overview of the Australian wine industry in its international context, while section 4 draws on the material contained in sections 2 and 3 in a bid to reflect on the degree to which the above mentioned statements to the market by the company could be viewed as reasonable, in all the circumstances.
Finally, section 5 contains the paper's conclusions.
The Evans & Tate Story
The Evans & Tate business was established by John Evans, Jan Evans, John Tate and Toni Tate 11 in 1971 with a small land holding in the Perth Hills. Within a short period of time the winegrowing potential of the then nascent Margaret River region was recognised by the founders and by 1974 the company had expanded to include operations at Redbrook, situated within the Margaret River district 12 . In the years that followed, the company successfully established a number of key brands which still remain an important element of the business 13 .
Though the Evans name precedes the Tate name in the company's title, the destiny of the company has for the greater part of its lifespan rested with the Tate family, the This was achieved through the execution of a successful, fully subscribed initial public offering which closed in late December 1999, pursuant to which the Tate family sold 42% of their holdings and the company raised a total of $26 million. At the close of the first day of trading, IPO participants had achieved stagging profits in the order of 20%, and the freshly listed company enjoyed a market capitalisation of slightly more than $50 million.
Prior to the initial public offering and acquisition of the Selwyn wine business, Evans & Tate could be best characterised as a vertically integrated 20 boutique producer of premium, super premium and ultra premium branded bottled wine (with greatest emphasis on super premium products) 21 . However, material change was close at hand.
Over the course of the next four years, the company metastised into an organism vastly different in scale and emphasis to that which had been profiled to investors in the 1999 IPO.
This change began with the Selwyn acquisition, which Evans & Tate rationalised as a key plank of its strategy to develop a meaningful non branded wine operation 22 . This business differed fundamentally to that which the company had previously developed, in that its central economic tenet revolved around volume, not margin. The Selwyn acquisition also resulted in a vineyard management business being bolted onto the pre existing wine making business, creating a service revenue stream to accompany the company's product based revenue streams 23 .
A further change to the business mix came with the company's decision to acquire the entities which undertook the distribution of much of its production in key markets. 42 .
Whereas by 2004, close to 60% of total Australian wine sales were to export markets 43 , only around 2% of Australian wine production was exported during the early 1980s 44 . Indeed, such gloom hung over the Australian wine industry by the mid 1980s that the Commonwealth Government funded a vine pull compensation scheme to encourage growers to switch out of grapes and into more profitable agricultural product production 45 .
Ironically it was at this time that a number of factors critical to transforming Australia's wine industry into a global facing export juggernaut were moving into alignment. First among these factors was the Australian dollar exchange rate, which after being allowed to float freely from December 1983 onwards, had depreciated significantly by mid 1986 46 . This substantially increased the competitiveness of Australian wine exports.
A second important factor was the restructuring of liquor retailing regulations in the United Kingdom which had taken place in the late 1970s, the major thrust of which was to allow supermarkets to retail alcoholic beverages in store, along with all other merchandise. By the mid 1980s, this had led to an environment in which the four major retail chains 47 accounted for the majority of all retail wine sales in Britain.
They in turn looked to producers able to supply quality product within strict cost parameters 48 . Australian producers fit the bill admirably. Further, their competition from other new world producers was limited at the time. Trade in South African wine was severely depressed in consequence of anti apartheid sentiment, and the Chilean and Argentinean industries were not at the time structured to support meaningful export activity 49 . That the mid 1980s also saw several wide scale contamination scares relating to European produced wine 50 cannot have harmed the export prospects of Australian producers to markets such as the United Kingdom 51 .
Thus the present day industry, though able to trace its roots to Australia's earliest colonial days, is best seen as a creature which began its emergence in the export resurgence which began in the mid 1980s 52 . The industry's achievements since that time have been hailed as nothing short of spectacularly successful 53 . clearly suggested a range of pressure points with the potential to destabilise and financially distress significant segments of the Australian wine production industry.
Continued imbalance between domestic production and consumption meant increasing reliance on the export sector at a time when close competitor wine producing nations were themselves expanding the ambit of their external orientation.
Simultaneously, ongoing rationalisation of the liquor retailing industry would continue to tip bargaining power from the hands of producers into the hands of the controllers of an emerging retailing duopoly, with adverse consequences for producer margins and profitability.
A beginning point for understanding how the data pointed to this scenario is to examine the changing makeup of the Australian wine industry from the late 1990s
onwards. There is little subtlety in this data. Viewed from any angle, the historical record bears witness to an enormous explosion of activity within the industry, with 800 new producers entering the industry between 1998 and 2004 55 (see Table 1 , below). The greatest number of new entrants to the industry during this period are best classified as very small businesses. The data in Table 1 shows that 492 out of the 800 identified new entrants over the period in question crushed less than 50 tonnes of grapes per annum 57 . During the same period, there was comparatively little growth in the number of wineries crushing 20,000 tonnes per annum.
However, this does not mean that the dimensions of the Australian industry's growth were limited to marked increases in the number of firms participating between 1998 and 2004. On the contrary, significant growth is evident on all key parameters pertaining to the scale of the industry. Of these, two of the most important for gauging the journey taken by the Australian wine industry during the period under review are the area of hectares under vine, and, consequent substantially upon that figure, the level of production of wine products achieved in any given year. Data pertaining to these factors is set out in Tables 2, and 3 (respectively), below. and 2004, the Australian wine industry was transformed not only because a far greater amount of land was deployed for the purpose of growing grapes to be used for the production of wine, but also, it seems, because much of the new land put under vine produced yields 62 that were higher than previous yield norms across the industry. This suggests a higher focus on lower quality grapes, something which would inevitably reflect in the quality of the end wine product. These trends are evident in the data set out in Table 3 , below. The data also reflects the overwhelming trouble the Australian wine industry would have encountered had it not been for its capacity to aggressively find new export markets -and expand those where a presence had already been built. Indeed, the available data makes it plain that success in export markets was not merely a desirable outcome for the Australian wine industry, but rather, a factor necessary to avert financial disaster. Despite this imperative, combined growth in domestic and export sales was insufficient to keep pace with the growth in quantities of wine being produced, leading to rising inventory levels. This problem had become so profound by Table 5 , below). In aggregate, this data clearly suggests a troubling prognosis for the industry. Large plantings of vine stock in higher yielding areas produced massive quantities of grapes not suitable for high end product, but rather, for wine products which would ultimately be sold to consumers on a primarily price driven basis. This outcome appears to fly in the face of the industry's earlier aspirations to develop a sustainable footing for the industry in export markets by creating value from "Brand Australia." Tables 6, 7 and 8 for data on wine production in these countries). The data in Tables 6 through 8 make it evident that the trajectory traced by Australia's close competitor wine producing nations was substantially similar to the Australian experience between the late 1990s and 2004 -that is, the area of hectares under grape vines, the quantum of wine grapes crushed and the volume of wine produced by these nations all grew, just as they had in Australia. Yet it was these same nations which were fighting for share of the same key markets as those into which Australian producers were attempting to place their products. Further, while new world producers (including Australia) ramped up production, global demand for wine remained essentially flat, and a considerable global surplus of wine stocks had emerged. The data in Table 9 (below) shows the magnitude of this problem at a global level. It suggests that in 2004 alone, wine producers throughout the world produced almost 576 million case equivalents of wine more than was consumed. In the same year, non Australian new world wine nations produced almost 572 million case equivalents. This means that had the United States, Argentina, Chile, South Africa and New Zealand produced no wine at all in 2004, the world would still have produced more wine than was consumed in that period 70 . The reality this brought to wine producers was stark. The basic operating model employed by both Coles and Woolworths is to achieve low prices by using scale to achieve leverage over producers. This means that considerable pressure is brought to bear to force would be suppliers to these behemoths to provide a range of rebates and other payments in return for the benefit of shelf space in high turnover sites 76 . The end result is even greater compression of producer margins and reduced financial viability for Australian wine producers, including Evans & Tate, to which the paper returns in section 4, below.
Impact of Industry Conditions on Evans & Tate
In its first full financial year subsequent to listing on the ASX, Evans & Tate Remarkably, even as pressure mounted on the company as a result of intensifying speculation that its relationship with its bankers was strained and that administrators had been appointed to the firm, Chairman Franklin Tate was strident in his rejection of the notion that Evans & Tate might be under financial threat. In an interview granted to The West Australian on June 22, Mr Tate claimed that he was "round eyed 89 " by industry speculation on the health of the company. While admitting his desire (and that of fellow directors) to see some reduction in debt and inventory levels, he dispelled any suggestion of financial difficulty saying, "we don't even have the symptoms so how can we get the disease….I'm puzzled as to where this sort of stuff comes from." notwithstanding an expected loss, the company still intended to declare dividends on its preference and ordinary shares, a key analytical benchmark would appear to be the extent to which the company's earnings pronouncements gelled with contemporaneously available evidence pertaining to the potential valuation vulnerability of the two key asset classes in question.
Self evidently, this is a difficult matter for enquiry and judgement, but at least some publicly available evidence assists in placing the matter in perspective. One means of assessing the vulnerability of the company's inventory assets to downwards valuation shocks is to examine the gross profit margins earned by the company on each case of wine sold over time. Higher per case gross margins achieved in the marketplace suggest a greater buffer against the need to engage in write downs against inventory balances. As the data set out in Table 10 suggests however, the prices commanded for Further, as the data in Table 11 indicates, in the period after the company's IPO, inventory holdings increased substantially, particularly in the wake of the Cranswick acquisition. Reflecting on the history of the Evans & Tate business 98 , the pattern of the data relating to the company's inventory holdings and turnover period is peculiar.
Prior to the Cranswick acquisition in 2003, the company's business was dominated by the production of super premium branded bottled wine, while afterwards, bulk wine and lower end bottled product represented by far the dominant segment of the company's business. Yet the average inventory holding period in the years prior to the Cranswick acquisition was measurably lower than that recorded afterwards, even though it would seem reasonable to expect quicker stock turn in a business dominated by lower quality product 99 than one in which high end product represented the largest of the firm's output categories. Taken together, the data suggests that Evans & Tate had significant inventory management problems from at least the time of the Cranswick acquisition, and that these were not resolved, even as market conditions steadily worsened. The hard reality was that a combination of unfavourable exchange rates, intensifying international competition, slack domestic demand and a fundamental reconfiguration of the power balance between wine producers and retailers (in favour of the retailers and ultimately, consumers) were all factors present in the operating environment faced by the company during and in the lead up to the period under consideration in this paper. These factors must be understood to have had significance not only for the valuation of the company's inventory, but also for its intangibles base.
It seems axiomatic to suggest that the value of a brand must be impaired in circumstances where the capacity of an organisation to generate positive profit margins in consequence of harnessing the brand for the purposes of driving sales activity is obviously diminishing. Stronger still does the same intuition render the same conclusion in relation to goodwill balances, which had ballooned in the wake of the sequence of flawed acquisition transactions discussed above. Yet here too Evans & Tate remained implacable. In the throes of a perfect storm, the firm's management does not seem to have been capable of countenancing the fact or the magnitude of the problems faced by their organisation and of shaping the appropriate reaction.
Conclusions
The analysis mapped out in sections 3 and 4 above suggests the adoption of a course It goes without saying that the apparent lacuna between the firm's underlying operational and financial reality and the image of the organisation promulgated in its various financial reports and additional information releases is deeply troubling. On reflection however, the shadow cast by this episode ought to be placed in the context of a much more perfidious matter -the utter silence in relation to this episode on the part of relevant regulatory, standard setting and professional bodies.
Good governance, in the end analysis, is the product not so much of the existence of layer upon layer of regulation coupled to edifices built high with arcane technical rules and provisions. It flows, instead, from the recognition and defence of principal.
Thus, while the analysis set out in this paper could be taken as an isolated forensic review of a particular instance (or set of instances) of asset misevaluation, its contribution is more readily understood when set against other recently marshalled evidence on substantial deviations, in financial statements and associated disclosures, from the ideal of presenting the hard economic substratum of firms to which they relate 106 .
Tacitus, writing on the subject of the great fire of Rome, reported that Nero stood on a private balcony a safe distance from the conflagration and extemporised verses comparing what he saw before him to the fall of Troy, whilst accompanying his oration with a lyre. In light of the growing body of evidence suggesting that there are matters of fundamental principal about which we should have great concern (of which this paper represents but one exemplar), one cannot help but wonder what his impression of contemporary trends in the regulation of financial reporting and continuous disclosure would be were he here to witness them. 
